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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RAYMOND FLORES SILVAZ, : Case No. 20020298-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
In responding to Mr. Silvaz's appellate brief, the State elected not to address the 
merits of the issues raised in this appeal and, instead, discussed inapplicable arguments 
that Mr. Silvaz never advanced. Mr. Silvaz has raised the relevant issues and provided 
reasoned analysis in support of them which the State has not rebutted. Specifically, rather 
than challenging the jury instructions as the State assumes, Mr. Silvaz demonstrated the 
incoherence of the Internet enticement statute itself. Because that statute is internally 
inconsistent, it is unconstitutionally vague and prevented a reasonable jury from 
convicting Mr. Silvaz. Rather than accepting the State's offer to re-write the statute, this 
Court must invalidate the statute and return it to the legislature for re-drafting based on 
the separation of powers doctrine. Additionally, the prosecutor's devastating comments 
on Mr. Silvaz's failure to present evidence of his innocence, requires reversal and a new 
trial. 
I. BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE IS CONTRADICTORY, THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE REQUIRES 
THE LEGISLATURE TO REDRAFT IT 
Mr. Silvaz first attacks the Internet enticement statute as being so conflicting and 
contradictory as to require this Court to invalidate that statute. The State's discussion of 
the elements of the offense fails to even address Mr. Silvaz's challenge to the coherence 
of the plain language of the statute itself. Because the competing terms of the Internet 
enticement statute cannot be reconciled, the separation of powers doctrine requires the 
legislature to remedy it. 
The plain language of the Internet enticement statute is "internally inconsistent." 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995). That statute specifically 
excludes from its definition all attempts, solicitations, or conspiracies to commit a sex 
crime, but, at the same time, requires the defendant to "solicit, seduce, lure, or entice" a 
minor to engage in sex or to "attempt" to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 
2002). These competing requirements state no crime, at all, because they are plainly 
contradictory and negate each other. The only way to reconcile these provisions would 
be to take the unlawful approach of "rendering] certain viable parts meaningless and 
void." Nelson. 905 P.2d at 876. Because it "lies within the province of our legislature" 
rather than the appellate courts to correct contradictory statutes, this Court must defer to 
the legislature to resolve the conflict. Id. 
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The State mistakenly relies on several cases that have construed other statutes that 
define crimes by including the phrase "not amounting to" another crime. In none of those 
cases did the appellant challenge the validity of the statute in question. Rather, the 
defendants argued in those cases that the State failed to prove an essential element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, the nonexistence of a more serious crime. 
State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, ffl[32-33, 8 P.3d 1025; State v. Montova, 910 P.2d 441, 444 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Peters. 550 P.2d 199, 199-200 (Utah 1976). In contrast, 
Mr. Silvaz directly attacks the language of the Internet enticement statute itself and claims 
that it is so incoherent that the legislature must re-draft it. 
The cases upon which the State relies are further inapposite because they rest on 
the assumption that the likely purpose behind the "not amounting to" language was "to 
encourage criminal punishment under th[e] greater crimes when the evidence in a 
particular case warrants i t" Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 444 (Utah Ct App. 1996); see 
Peters, 550 P.2d at 199 ("Counsel would have us require the State to prove there was no 
rape, - a greater crime, - in order to prove a lesser crime. Such a course, in logic, 
obviously is inimical to the interests of the accused."); Reed, 2000 UT 68, <|33, 8 P.3d 
1025. Accordingly, these courts concluded that the State could "'ignore proof as to lack 
of any greater offense.'" Reed. 2000 UT 68,1J33, 8 P.3d 1025 (quoting Peters. 550 P.2d 
at 199-200. 
But, here, all of the offenses in question impose the same penalty and do not 
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promote greater punishment. The crimes of attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, and Internet 
enticement, all punish convicted persons one degree lower than the targeted crime. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102 (1999); 76-4-202 (1999); 76-4-204 (1999); 76-4-401(3) (Supp. 
2002). Thus, unlike the statutes in the cases the state cites, this Court cannot dismiss the 
plain language of the Internet enticement statute as mere surplusage based on a legislative 
goal to encourage the punishment of greater offenses. Rather, because the Internet 
enticement statute is so contradictory, it defines no crime at all. Accordingly, this Court 
must return the statute to the legislature for clarification. Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876. 
II. THE CONTRADICTORY TERMS OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE RENDER IT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Contrary to the State's claims, Mr. Silvaz thoroughly demonstrated the vagueness 
of the Internet Enticement statute. After showing that the statute is contradictory and 
inconsistent, Mr. Silvaz argued that the statute was so incomprehensible that it violated 
several vagueness doctrines. The State itself illustrates the statute's confusion when it 
unsuccessfully attempts to reconcile the statute with other inchoate crimes. The State's 
failed efforts simply bolster Mr. Silvaz's vagueness arguments. 
The State mistakenly assails Mr. Silvaz for including an "insufficient1' discussion 
of the vagueness doctrine as applied to the Internet enticement statute. State's Brief at 13. 
To the contrary, Mr. Silvaz fully explained in both subsections I and II of the Argument 
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section of his brief how the Internet Enticement Statute was internally inconsistent, 
contradictory, and failed to "explain any difference between an inchoate crime and the 
prohibited conduct." Appellant's Brief at 23-30. He then tested the statute under the 
various tests for the vagueness doctrine and demonstrated that the statute failed to provide 
adequate notice of prohibited conduct. The State's complaints are unavailing. 
The State itself establishes the incomprehensibility of the Internet enticement 
statute in its attempts to decipher the language of that provision. First, when the State 
asserts that each term of that statute has an '"usually accepted meaning,'" it 
conspicuously omits the requirement that the defendant's conduct cannot "amount[] to an 
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation." State's Brief at 15 (quoting State v. Coonce. 2001 
UT App 355, f 9, 36 P.3d 533 (original quotation omitted)). The State's apparent need to 
exclude the challenged phrase from its discussion suggests that the statute is not as clear 
as the State asserts. 
Second, in its efforts to reconcile the Internet enticement statute with the attempt, 
conspiracy, and solicitation statutes, the State demonstrates how confusing the language 
of the Internet enticement statute actually is. Specifically concerning attempt, the State 
again ignores the operative phrase "not amounting to an attempt" in arguing that the State 
would have no reason to prosecute a defendant for attempt under Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-4-301 (1999). State's Brief at 17. That provision requires prosecutors to pursue the 
more specific offense over an attempt crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-301 (1999). 
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According to the State, the Internet enticement statute is more specific than an attempt. 
State's Brief at 17 (citing)). 
The plain language of the Internet enticement statute rebuts the State's arguments. 
That statute's requirement that the conduct at issue not amount to an attempt, appears to 
be specific and requires the State to prosecute an attempt instead of the Internet 
enticement statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-301 (1999). Moreover, the phrase following 
the definition of Internet enticement casts doubt on this plain language. The next phrase 
describes Internet enticement as an attempt crime in criminalizing the use of a computer 
Hto solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempt to solicit seduce, lure, or entice a minor1' to 
engage in sex. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002). These competing phrases 
simply cannot be reconciled. 
This conflict completely fails to explain when a person should be charged under 
the Internet enticement statute or the attempt statute. Although criminal statutes may 
overlap, they must be "sufficiently clear and definite to inform reasonable persons of 
ordinary intelligence" what conduct is illegal. State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1322 
(Utah 1986) (quoting Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974)). Here, the 
contradictory provisions fail to provide reasonable persons guidance of what conduct 
constitutes Internet enticement. 
Similarly, the State provides no support for its assertion that conspiracy and 
solicitation would only apply to efforts to invite a minor to become a sexual "perpetrator." 
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State's Brief at 17. Again, the plain language of the statute appears to require prosecutors 
to charge conspiracy and solicitation whenever a defendant's conduct "amount[s] to" one 
of those offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002). Moreover, given the 
statute's language that requires that no inchoate offense exists and at the same time 
describes conduct that amounts to an inchoate crime, it is unclear how and when the 
various statutes apply, at all. If anything, the State's failed efforts to explain these 
distinctions illustrate the vagueness and inherent confusion in the Internet enticement 
statute. 
Because the Internet enticement statute is incomprehensible, it fails to provide 
ordinary persons of reasonable intelligence of what conduct is prohibited. Blowers, 717 
P.2d at 1322. The vague language further places no limits on police officers' discretion 
to apply the statute. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999). Finally, the 
statute is so conflicting "'that it cannot be executed.'" Commonwealth v. Harbst, 763 
A.2d 953, 957 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (quoting Pennsylvania Builders Association v. 
Dep't of Revenue, 552 A.2d 730, 737 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)). Because Mr. Silvaz 
supported his vagueness challenges, he requests this Court to reverse his conviction for 
enticement. 
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HI. THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE 
INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE PREVENTED A 
REASONABLE JURY FROM FINDING GUILT BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
As a corollary to the preceding two arguments, Mr. Silvaz contends that a 
reasonable jury could not have convicted him because the Internet enticement statute is so 
confusing. Mr. Silvaz does not dispute the facts presented at trial. Rather, he contends 
that the jury could not have concluded from those facts that he violated the Internet 
enticement statute given the conflicting evidence of his intent and, more importantly, the 
"convoluted terms" of the Internet enticement statute. Appellant's Brief at 31. In sum, 
the statute is so unwieldy that reasonable jurors could not have made sense of it nor 
reasonably applied the facts to it. 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER COMMENTS ON 
MR. SILVAZ'S FAILURE TO PRESENT "EVIDENCE" 
DESTROYED MR. SILVAZ'S CREDIBILITY 
Reversal is also warranted because the prosecutor's closing arguments directly 
faulted Mr. Silvaz for not presenting evidence and witnesses to support his defense 
theory. Contrary to the state's claims, these comments were not fair inferences from the 
evidence or comments on credibility. Rather, they were direct comments on Mr. Silvaz's 
failure to call witnesses or present evidence in his behalf. In any event, the State never 
met its obligation to seek an advanced ruling on the admissibility of the comments as 
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required under Utah law. Likewise, the State does not contest that the witnesses were 
equally available to both Mr. Silvaz and to the prosecution. Because the prosecutor's 
improper comments completely undermined Mr. Silvaz's credibility, they prejudiced his 
defense and influenced the jury's verdict. 
In addressing the jury, the prosecutor directly commented on Mr. Silvaz's failure 
to present evidence and witness testimony of his innocence. The prosecutor specifically 
noted the absence of "evidence of [Mr. Silvaz's] friends who told him what to say.,f R. 
212: 154 (emphasis added). The prosecutor then claimed that Mr. Silvaz's story that he 
listened to his friends was "convenient" and "exactly what probably should be said" to 
avoid conviction. R. 212: 154. In conclusion, the prosecutor urged the jury to focus on 
the "evidence" that was presented, rather than Mr. Silvaz's "convenient" story. R. 212: 
157. 
These comments went far beyond making inferences from Mr. Silvaz's testimony 
and commenting on his credibility. They directly and specifically accused Mr. Silvaz of 
lying because he failed to present "evidence" to support his claims. Prosecutors offer 
improper argument when they raise "matters the jury would not be justified in 
considering." State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989). Such improper matters 
include arguments that imply that a criminal defendant must present evidence or call 
witnesses to prove the defense theory. State v. Thompson. 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the prosecutor unmistakably argued that had Mr. Silvaz testified truthfully, his 
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online friends would have testified in support of him. 
These comments exceeded the scope of proper closing arguments. Prosecutors 
have latitude to "fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom." Hopkins. 782 P.2d 478 (emphasis added). But, rather than "fully" 
addressing the evidence and drawing inferences, the prosecutor below focused on Mr. 
Silvaz's failure to call witnesses and present evidence and did not even mention Mr. 
Silvaz's explanation for failing to do so. Had the prosecutor truly commented on the 
credibility of Mr. Silvaz's testimony, he would have also addressed Mr. Silvaz's concern 
for keeping his friends anonymous to protect them from criminal prosecution and public 
humiliation. 
The State mischaracterizes the record when it claims the prosecutor merely 
commented on Mr. Silvaz's credibility based on his "unwillingness to identify those 
friends." State's Brief at 24. Rather than drawing a reasonable inference, the prosecutor 
skewed Mr. Silvaz's testimony, gave an incomplete version of it, and called the jury's 
attention to improper matters. State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985). 
Specifically, the prosecutor erroneously emphasized that an innocent person would have 
presented his friends' testimony in direct violation of Mr. Silvaz's right to require the 
State to meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 1057-58. 
Regardless of the nature of the prosecutor's comments, the State does not contest 
that the prosecutor plainly erred in failing to obtain an advanced ruling before 
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commenting on the lack of witness testimony. Utah law requires the proponent of a 
missing witness argument to obtain l,can advance ruling from the trial court'" that a 
missing witness is peculiarly within the opposing party's power to locate. Thompson, 
776 P.2d at 50 (quoting Gass v. United States. 416 F.2d 767, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); see 
also Smith, 706 P.2d at 1057. The State does not contest that it failed to seek an 
advanced ruling nor does it argue that Mr. Silvaz's friends were uniquely available to 
him. Thus, the State implicitly concedes that it failed to satisfy the threshold 
requirements to present missing witness argument. 
The prosecutor's improper comments also harmed the defense. To support 
reversal, prosecutorial misconduct must cause "a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant." Hopkins. 782 P.2d at 478. The prosecutor's 
comments were not a "fleeting" reference during closing arguments, as the State 
maintains. State's Brief at 24. Rather, the prosecutor shaped the entire theme of his 
arguments around his assertion that the jury must focus on "the evidence that is there, not 
the convenient stuff that is not there." R. 212: 157. More than a mere passing reference, 
these comments directly addressed the only issue for the jury's consideration: Mr. 
Silvaz's truthfulness. When the jury's verdict rests principally on the veracity of the 
witnesses, prosecutorial comments on the witnesses' credibility render a different verdict 
more likely. State v. VaiL 2002 UT App 176, ^|17, 51 P.3d 1285; State v. Stefaniak, 900 
P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Such is the case here. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Silvaz requests this Court to invalidate the Internet enticement statute and to 
reverse his conviction under that provision. 
SUBMITTED this a^day of November, 2002. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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